Isom Studies Causes of Democratic Backsliding
Posted Mar 3, 2026
After spending the Spring of 2025 studying abroad in Hungary, Eva Isom decided to examine democratic backsliding. Besides Hungary, others fear that other democracies, such as the U.S., are also backsliding. Thus, she wants to examine whether we can predict democratic backsliding based on structural variables, specifically procedural barriers and opposition strength.
She begins examining what democratic backsliding is. For most scholars, it involved a deterioration in electoral integrity, fundamental rights, and the rule of law. Quantitatively, many scholars look for a 15-50% drop in the nation’s Liberal Democratic Index assessed by V-Dem.
She tests two hypotheses. First, countries that experience democratic backsliding will be in the bottom quartile of Procedural Barrier Scores and Opposition Strength Scores in the six years leading to the backsliding. (i.e., these two variables are necessary for democratic backsliding0. Second, countries that score in the bottom quartile of both Procedural Barrier Scores and Opposition Strength Scores will experience democratic backsliding within the next six years. (i.e., these two variables are sufficient for democratic backsliding).
She uses a comparative case study approach using V-Dem data. She uses the average score for various nations from 2014 to 2016 as the baseline. She then compares these to average V-Dem scores for 2022-2024 to see how much backsliding occurs. Her case studies include Mexico and Georgia (low procedural barriers and weak opposition), Argentina and Lesotho (low procedural barriers and strong opposition), Lithuania and Israel (high procedural barriers and weak opposition), and the UK, the US, and Australia (high procedural barriers and strong opposition).
She finds that strong opposition prevents backsliding because they act as a check, even when institutions are weak. Of course, nations low in opposition strength did experience backsliding. Second, countries with low procedural barriers were likely to backslide. These nations have few institutional, legal, and normative safeguards (e.g., independent judiciary, constraints on executive power, checks and balances) that make it difficult for leaders to undermine democratic norms through legal or procedural means. Third, the most stable nations had high procedural barriers and a strong opposition.
Overall, she had several conclusions. First, when low procedural barriers and weak opposition are both present in a country, democratic backsliding is highly likely to occur. Second, deviations from these predictions generally occur when powerful outside factors (discovery of oil, for example) are present. Third, the coexisting presence of low procedural barriers and weak opposition in a country is not required for democratic backsliding to occur.