Patrick Examines Terrorist Group Transitions
Posted Feb 9, 2026
Sarah Grace Patrick wrote her senior thesis on the factors that encourage a terrorist group to transition to a peaceful political party. In particular, she examines where Islamic terrorist groups struggle more with this transition.
The literature shows that a mutually hurting stalemate for the terrorist group and government, third-party intervention, and constituent support of the terrorist group are requirements for a transition. Moreover, the terrorist groups typically transition because they can broaden their domestic support and gain access to greater international support.
In her research, she compares several types of groups. Nationalist groups are concerned with advancing the group’s shared identity. Ideological groups have more robust aims and are less likely to compromise. They can also find ideological support across borders to sustain them. Religious groups have an all-encompassing view and are less likely to compromise because their beliefs are divinely sanctioned. Their members are also more dedicated to the cause, which makes transitions difficult. Specifically, Islamic groups struggle because they consider all of Palestine Islamic land, which makes compromise extremely difficult.
She then tests several hypotheses. First, terrorist groups that are ideologically motivated are less likely to have a successful transition to a political party. Second, terrorist groups that are religiously motivated are less likely to have a successful transition to a political party. Third, terrorist groups that have strong international networks or connections are less likely to successfully transition to a political party. Her comparative case studies examine several variables affecting the transition, such as the type of movement, international network, presence of a stalemate, and a weak government.
She examines seven Islamic terrorist groups in her comparative case study. They are the PLO, Hamas, Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka), Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Hezbollah (Lebanon), and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK in Turkey). She finds that the PLO is the only group that was able to transition to a political party. It was a secular party, there was no government to replace, it was connected to the pan-Arab world, and sought a transition.
Hamas and the Tamil Tigers were the only two failures. While Hamas was religious and the Tigers were secular, neither side had a monopoly on the use of force; Hamas had international connections, while the Tamil Tigers did not. Hamas never attempted to transition to a political party, but the Tigers tried and failed.
The remaining groups were partially successful. The Muslim Brotherhood was religious, had a weak identity, and an international network. It transitioned to a political party and actually governed Egypt for a while. However, its authoritarian nature led the military to launch a coup. FARC was secular, was fighting a difficult war with Colombia, and had a minimal international connection. It transitioned to a political party but did not gain power. Hezbollah was also religious, Lebanon was a weak state, allowing it to influence it, and had international connections. It did not transition to a political party but had success influencing the government by using its parliamentary representation to veto things it did not like. Finally, the PKK was secular and nationalist, struggled against the Turkish government, had support from other Kurdish groups, but did not transition to a political party. Yet, it has had some success in gaining concessions from the government.
Reviewing her results, she found that ideologically motivated groups often became less extreme or were willing to compromise in their ideology. Second, religious groups did not become less extreme over time and were less willing to compromise their goals and beliefs. Third, in the cases of religiously connected networks, the hypothesis remained intact. In the other cases, the international networks made little to no impact on the outcome of negotiations.
She concluded that terrorist groups with more limited goals don’t seek expansion. Second, ideologically motivated groups were willing to compromise while religious groups maintained their ideology. Third, religious groups had more substantial international networks based on a shared belief.